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External factors and monetary policy: Indian evidence 
Subir Gokarn and Bhupal Singh
1 
1. Introduction 
Two decades ago, when the Indian economy was less open and only moderately integrated 
with the global economy, monetary policy had a relatively simple task in assessing growth 
and inflation. Since then, with significant trade and capital account openness, the domestic 
economy has become considerably more integrated with the global economy and domestic 
financial markets reflect global developments very quickly. The transmission channels 
through which global factors impact the domestic economy and financial markets are 
numerous and complex. In India, it appears that all four channels of transmission (the trade, 
financial, commodity price and expectations channels) operated and adversely affected real 
activity during the recent global crisis. However, the strengths of the different channels of 
transmission varied. Given this, monetary policy had to carefully gauge global risks so as to 
inform its assessment of the growth and inflation outlook.  
The concerns of monetary policy about external developments or shocks revolve around the 
objectives of ensuring price and output stability, and also financial stability to the extent it 
affects price and output stability. Output stability concerns may emanate from the impact of 
external shocks on the domestic economy mainly through the trade and financial channels. 
The intensity of impact would to a large extent depend on reliance on external demand 
(trade) as a driver of growth, the degree of cyclicality of certain export-dependent sectors and 
the dependence on external savings to finance growth. Price stability would be affected 
mainly through commodity price shocks and the import intensity of the production process, 
and through exchange rate developments. The financial stability objective may be impacted 
by the degree of openness of the financial sector, the asset-liability mix, volatility in capital 
flows with sudden stops and reversals, and foreign inflows leading to overshooting of 
domestic asset prices such as equities and real estate. This paper sets out briefly why 
monetary policy has become more sensitive to global developments and the key challenges 
from global factors for monetary management.  
2.  How globalised and integrated is the Indian economy? 
Before examining how monetary policy formulation in India has been shaped by external 
factors, it is pertinent to understand how and to what extent the Indian economy is integrated 
with the global economy. The globalisation process in India was reinforced during the 1990s 
and 2000s due to several important developments.  
First, despite the dominance of domestic demand, the role of trade in conditioning the growth 
process in India has become important over time. Trade openness increased substantially, 
with the trade/GDP ratio doubling during the last decade. Second, services, which were 
largely considered non-tradable, became increasingly tradable mainly due to offshoring led 
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by rapid innovations in information technology, labelled as information technology-enabled 
services (ITES) and business process outsourcing (BPO). A significant boost to global 
integration thus came through rapid growth in India’s international trade in services in the 
2000s, enabled by the expansion in information technology that facilitated the cross-border 
delivery of services. Third, the trade channel of global integration has been, concomitantly, 
supported by workers’ remittances, in both the unskilled and skilled market segments. 
Fourth, the economy became more open to external capital flows. The gross capital 
account/GDP ratio witnessed a more than threefold increase during the period. Progressive 
liberalisation of the capital account was initiated in the 1990s and continued through the 
2000s, contributing to the process of financial integration. The financial channel emerged as 
a dominant factor with gross capital flows (inflows plus outflows) rising to nearly 50% of GDP 
in 2009–10 from an average of about 5% in the 1980s (Table 1). Fifth, higher capital account 
openness also strengthened the integration of domestic markets with global markets, as 
reflected in the stronger correlations of equity and commodity prices with their global 
counterparts. These developments also facilitated the role of expectations in transmitting 
global shocks to the domestic economy. Sixth, even in commodity-producing sectors, global 
integration also occurred through prices and not necessarily through physical trade, as global 
price movements have an important expectations impact on domestic prices.  
 
Table 1 
Openness indicators of the Indian economy 
(In percentages of GDP) 











1970s 10.0  1.3  12.7  4.2  16.9 
1980s 12.7  2.5  17.2  5.4  22.6 
1990s 18.8  4.1  26.8  15.1  41.9 
2000s 29.7  9.7  45.4  33.8  79.2 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy and Monograph on India’s Balance 
of Payments.  
 
With increased global integration, the Indian economy has been subject to greater influence 
of global business cycles. The degree of co-movement between the Indian and global 
business cycles has significantly increased since the liberalisation of Indian economy 
(Figures 1a and 1b). The correlation between the cyclical component of the index of 
industrial production (IIP) of the advanced economies and that of India rose to 0.62 during 
the period 1993–2010 from 0.18 in during 1970–92. The greater cyclical synchronisation of 
the business cycle during recent periods is indicative of the growing global integration of the 
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Figure 1a  Figure 1b 
Business cycles of advanced economies 
and India: 1970–92 
Business cycles of advanced economies 
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India’s financial integration with the world has been as deep as, if not deeper than, its trade 
globalisation (Subbarao (2010)). The deceleration in India’s growth associated with the 
current global slowdown is also testimony to the increased global integration of the domestic 
economy. Besides the synchronisation of trade cycles, the financial channel to integration 
has also become prominent during the recent period. A causal analysis between the cyclical 
component of Indian (BSE) and US stock prices (S&P 500 Index and Nasdaq index) 
empirically validates the influence of global stock price movements on domestic stock prices 
(Table 2).  
 
Table 2 
Causality between the Indian and US stock prices 
Sample period: January 1993–December 2010 
Null hypothesis  F-statistic  Result 
∆BSE index does not Granger cause ∆Nasdaq 0.23  Accept 
∆Nasdaq does not Granger cause ∆BSE index  8.00
*** Reject 
∆BSE index does not Granger cause ∆S&P 500  0.94  Accept 
∆S&P 500 does not Granger cause ∆BSE index  7.37
*** Reject 
***  Significant at the 1% level. Variables are seasonally adjusted. 
 
These shifts in the degree of synchronisation of the Indian trade and business cycles with the 
global cycles and increased correlation of financial asset prices in the past two decades 
indicate that India cannot remain impervious to the global shocks. Empirically, it has been 
established that financial channels have assumed a more dominant role in transmitting the 
global shocks. Monetary policy thus has to take due account of risks arising from external 
factors in its assessment of the inflation and growth outlook. 192  BIS Papers No 57
 
 
3. Capital  flows,  exchange  rates and financial stability 
An external stability objective of monetary policy entails minimising the risks associated with 
financing a current account deficit with volatile capital inflows, which may disrupt economic 
activity. Volatile and excessive capital flows have the potential to destabilise the exchange 
rate and may have implications for domestic liquidity and asset price volatility. Sharp 
appreciation of the exchange rate, regardless of fundamentals, adversely impacts the relative 
global competitiveness of low value added manufactured exports of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), akin to Dutch disease. As the Reserve Bank is concerned not only about 
output and price stability but also financial stability, it attaches paramount importance to 
ensuring stability of the financial markets and institutions against adverse external shocks.  
Since the initiation of the reform process in the early 1990s, India has encouraged all major 
forms of capital flows, though with caution from the viewpoint of macroeconomic stability. 
There have been occasional sharp swings (Figure 2a), which have engendered appropriate 
policy responses. These include changes in reserve requirements for financial entities, 
variations in the pace and sequencing of the reform measures and revisions in conditions 
governing the end use of external funds. A widening current account deficit (CAD) in India 
amidst volatile capital flows has also raised concerns about its sustainable financing and the 
impact of such flows on domestic asset prices. Portfolio inflows are closely associated with 
movements in stock prices (Figure 2b). There is, however, a bidirectional causal relationship 
between the two, indicating that they reinforce each other. Nevertheless, the role of capital 
flows in an asset price build-up cannot be ignored. While excessive volatility in the exchange 
rate induced by volatile capital flows poses problems for exporters and importers in making 
assessments about their future business decisions, capital flow-induced volatility in asset 
prices may adversely affect the investment climate and have an adverse impact on growth.  
 
Figure 2a  Figure 2b 



















































































































































































































































































Net FII flows  Sensex (RHS)
FII = foreign institutional investors. 
 
There are both long-term and short-term issues in relation to the central bank’s role in 
external management. Should the exchange rate be a policy instrument for long-term 
growth? Are the choices and trade-offs different between large and small economies? These 
are important questions in the current global economic debate. However, in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis, a major concern has emerged with respect to the possibility of large 
capital inflows into emerging market economies (EMEs). This reflects the unevenness of the 
strength of the recovery in advanced economies and EMEs and the attempts by the former to 
find ways to continue to provide stimulus. EMEs are worried that a surge would destabilise BIS Papers No 57  193
 
 
their domestic economies through exchange rate appreciation or excess liquidity in a 
situation where central banks are fighting with demand pressures.  
What should central banks be doing to deal with this situation? While the justification for 
capital controls is subject to several conditions, clearly, many countries that do not meet all 
those conditions would be equally tempted to use controls as a way of protecting themselves 
against the threats to stability from volatile capital flows and exchange rates and domestic 
liquidity conditions. Is this an argument for capital controls? One may agree with this to a 
limited extent, reflecting the conditions during the crisis and how different groups of countries 
have emerged from it. However, the specific conditions, both domestic and global, that would 
determine the desirability of capital controls for specific countries need to be thought through 
(Gokarn (2010b)). 
Intervention to manage the exchange rate is another way in which a central bank may 
contribute to external stability. From a short-term perspective, the decision to intervene in 
order to avoid destabilising both exporting and import-competing domestic producers needs 
to be viewed in the overall context of domestic conditions. Masaaki Shirakawa, Governor, 
Bank of Japan, argues that in a situation in which policy rates are already at the zero 
boundary, exchange rate appreciation, which helps dampen inflationary pressures, would 
allow the low interest rate scenario to persist, thereby raising the risks of an asset price 
bubble (Shirakawa (2010)).  
The Reserve Bank’s policy on exchange rates has been articulated as broadly 
non-interventionist, except when confronted with excessively volatile, lumpy or disruptive 
flows. This is an approach consistent with the notions of “flexibility” or “constrained 
discretion” used in the context of boundary conditions for traditional approaches to monetary 
policy. Essentially, these are conditions that would presumably trigger some deviation from 
normal policy if abnormal circumstances were to arise. What would constitute abnormal 
conditions, of course, cannot be explicitly indicated but will presumably be defined by specific 
circumstances in which actions are taken. 
From the standpoint of financial stability, shocks to domestic asset prices led by uneven 
capital flows (ie sudden spurts and sporadic reversals) become a concern for central banks. 
Such pressures on asset prices can cause capital losses for entities which have large 
exposure to such assets and can be a source of instability. In India, however, these adverse 
spillovers of volatile capital flows are minimised through prudential sectoral exposure limits 
on bank lending, risk weights and provisioning norms.  
4.  Pass-through of global shocks to domestic inflation in India 
External shocks to domestic prices can come mainly through two channels: commodity 
prices and the exchange rate. The pass-through takes place in two stages. First, export 
prices of trading partners at global and regional levels percolate to import prices of India. 
Second, changes in import prices affect costs of production and domestic supply of goods 
and services, thus affecting aggregate domestic inflation measured by producers’ prices, 
which, in India, are represented by wholesale prices. The most direct impact of global prices 
on the domestic economy comes through the prices of primary commodities. 
The impact of exchange rate movements on prices of imported commodities depends on the 
extent to which the exchange rates are transmitted to import prices denominated in the 
domestic currency. The literature suggests that some of the important determinants of pass-
through are low global inflation and its lower volatility, the volatility of the exchange rate, the 
share of imports in domestic consumption, the trade/GDP ratio, the composition of imports, 
the invoicing pattern of trade, and tariffs and quantitative restrictions. Various empirical 
estimates of the exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices in India suggest that a   
10 per cent change in the exchange rate could lead to a change in domestic prices in the 194  BIS Papers No 57
 
 
range of 1–2 per cent in the long run (RBI (2004); Khundrakpam (2007); Mihaljek and Klau 
(2008)). 
It is evident that, except in the 1970s, India’s import price inflation remained higher than 
domestic inflation through the 1980s to the 2000s (Figure 3). Higher imported inflation during 
the 2000s was mainly led by the categories “crude materials”, “mineral fuels, lubricants”, 
“animal and vegetable oil, fats and waxes” and “chemicals and related products”, 
underscoring the role of global commodity price shocks in domestic inflation process. Higher 
imported inflation relative to domestic inflation, particularly since the 1990s, thus suggests 
the following. First, global commodity price shocks have become more dominant, particularly 
mineral oil and metals, led by rising demand from the emerging market economies. Second, 
the pass-through of imported input prices may have been limited due to either the public 
policy interventions or the ability of producers of final consumption goods to absorb the rising 
costs by improving productivity in the usage of such inputs or by adjusting profit margins in 
the face of higher market competition, both internal and external.  
 
Figure 3 
Imported and domestic inflation in India 
 
 
The results from causal analysis reveal that in agricultural commodities such as rice, 
soybean oil, sugar, tea and cotton, global prices cause changes in domestic prices. Since in 
this bivariate analysis we are not controlling for domestic production shocks or expectations, 
the results imply that apart from domestic production, external supply shocks play an 
important role in the evolution of prices of such agricultural commodities in India. In the case 
of wheat and peanut oil, the causality is found to be reverse, implying that domestic prices 




Causal relationship between global and  
domestic prices of agricultural commodities 
Sample period: January 1994–March 2011 






Changes in world rice prices do not Granger cause 
changes in rice prices in India  2.57
*** Yes  8 
Changes in rice prices in India do not Granger cause 
changes in world rice prices   0.44  No   
Changes in world wheat prices do not Granger cause 
changes in wheat prices in India  0.34  No  3 
Changes in wheat prices in India do not Granger cause 
changes in world wheat prices   3.93
*** Yes   
Changes in world maize prices do not Granger cause 
changes in maize prices in India  1.39  No  4 
Changes in maize prices in India do not Granger cause 
changes in world maize prices   0.73  No   
Changes in world groundnut oil prices do not Granger 
cause changes in groundnut oil prices in India  0.27 No  1 
Changes in groundnut oil prices in India do not 
Granger cause changes in world groundnut oil prices   3.90
** Yes   
Changes in world soybean oil prices do not Granger 
cause changes in soybean oil prices in India  2.01
** Yes  9 
Changes in soybean oil prices in India do not Granger 
cause changes in world soybean oil prices   0.87  No   
Changes in world sugar prices do not Granger cause 
changes in sugar prices in India  2.08
** Yes  6 
Changes in sugar prices in India do not Granger cause 
changes in world sugar prices   0.32  No   
Changes in world tea prices do not Granger cause 
changes in tea prices in India  3.26
** Yes  2 
Changes in tea prices in India do not Granger cause 
changes in world tea prices   0.98 No   
Changes in world cotton prices do not Granger cause 
changes in cotton prices in India  6.12
*** Yes  3 
Changes in cotton prices in India do not Granger 
cause changes in world cotton prices   0.47  No   
***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Test results from Granger causality in the case of non-agricultural commodities also provide 
some important insights into the impact of global shocks on the inflation process in India. 
There is significant causality from global crude oil prices to domestic prices of petroleum with 
a six-month lag. The lag in the transmission can be attributed mainly to an administered price 
mechanism, which does not allow an immediate pass-through of global price changes to 196  BIS Papers No 57
 
 
domestic price changes. Apart from oil, there is evidence of significant causality from world 
prices to domestic prices in commodities such as coal, iron ore and aluminium, which are 
important inputs for the manufacturing sector and can potentially cause shocks to 
manufactured product price inflation (Table 4).  
 
Table 4 
Causal relationship between global and  
domestic prices of non-agricultural commodities 
Sample period: January 1994–March 2011 






Changes in world oil prices do not Granger cause 
changes in oil prices in India  8.96
*** Yes  6 
Changes in oil prices in India do not Granger cause 
changes in world oil prices   1.96
* Yes   
Changes in world coal prices do not Granger cause 
changes in coal prices in India  3.46
** Yes  2 
Changes in coal prices in India do not Granger cause 
changes in world coal prices   0.01  No   
Changes in world iron ore prices do not Granger cause 
changes in iron ore prices in India  8.96
*** Yes  1 
Changes in iron ore prices in India do not Granger 
cause changes in world iron ore prices   0.13  No   
Changes in world aluminium prices do not Granger 
cause changes in aluminium prices in India  18.17
*** Yes  1 
Changes in aluminium prices in India do not Granger 
cause changes in world aluminium prices   0.93  No   
Changes in world copper prices do not Granger cause 
changes in copper prices in India  0.45  No  4 
Changes in copper prices in India do not Granger 
cause changes in world copper prices   0.16 No   
Changes in world silver prices do not Granger cause 
changes in silver prices in India  2.31
** Yes  5 
Changes in silver prices in India do not Granger cause 
changes in world silver prices   2.83
** Yes   
Changes in world urea prices do not Granger cause 
changes in urea prices in India  1.00 No  13 
Changes in urea prices in India do not Granger cause 
changes in world urea prices   1.73
* Yes   
***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
An analysis of two broad global commodity price cycles – 2002 to early 2009 and the current 
one beginning April 2009 – suggests that the pass-through of global commodity prices to 
domestic prices does not seem to be complete (Table 5). Pass-through seems to be higher 
in the case of metals as compared with food items. This could be attributed to several 
factors. First, there are restrictions on trade in food grains. Second, food grain prices may be BIS Papers No 57  197
 
 
conditioned more by domestic supply conditions and low dependence on imports to meet 
domestic demand. Third, there is a larger dependence on imports for minerals and metals 
and strong procyclicality in prices such commodities. Fourth, due to trading in minerals and 
metals on both domestic and global exchanges, prices of such commodities seem to be 
more correlated with global prices as compared with agricultural commodities, where a 
number of regulatory restrictions are in place. Thus, risks to domestic inflation from external 
shocks seem to emanate more from mineral and metal prices, which generally exhibit strong 
procyclical movement.  
 
Table 5 
Increase in international and domestic commodity prices 
(Year-on-year average, in per cent) 
2002:04–2008:08 2008:09–2009:03 2009:04–2011:05 
Commodities 
World India World India World India 
Minerals  and  metals        
Aluminium  11.8  5.2  –31.5 –0.4 10.5 –2.8 
Coal  33.4 5.1 7.8 4.6 9.6 6.6 
Copper  32.5 2.1  –45.0 0.0  31.9 5.5 
Gold  19.8 16.1  1.9 24.2 22.9 22.6 
Iron  ore  26.5 55.7 48.3 29.1 57.9 26.7 
Petroleum  28.7 9.7  –34.0 8.1  16.2 7.0 
Silver  24.0 20.0  –25.0 –3.6 40.5 40.7 
Urea  32.4  0.8 –0.6  0.0 –4.0  4.3 
Agricultural  commodities        
Cotton  10.7  6.2  –18.1 21.0 54.5 22.3 
Edible oil groundnut  24.7  9.9  –2.4  –4.9  –3.0  6.9 
Edible oil soybean  15.8  10.2  19.6  3.7  7.5  2.1 
Maize  17.1  5.7 –4.3 12.3 13.8 14.0 
Rice  24.4 2.7  55.7  13.3  –13.3 9.1 
Sugar  13.2  1.9 12.9 17.1 38.0 21.4 
Tea  6.0 5.4  16.2  47.4 9.6 7.8 
Wheat  20.7 4.6  –34.0 5.4 7.3 6.5 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
Despite the incomplete pass-through of international price shocks to domestic prices in India, 
there could be potential pressures arising from global demand-supply imbalances in certain 
commodities. Moderation in the projected global stocks of cereals and non-cereals for   
2010–11 suggests that global price pressures on these commodities may persist, which may 




Global commodity stock position 
(Ending stocks in million metric tons) 
   2008–09  2009–10  2010–11
1 2011–12
2 
Wheat 167  198  190  182 
Coarse grains  194  195  157  149 
Rice 92  94  96  96 
Cotton
3 61  44  44  51 
Oilseeds 57  71  76  71 
Oil meals  6  8  8  8 
Vegetable oils  14  13  11  10 
Corn     144  121  116 
1  Estimated.    
2  Projected.    
3  In million 480 lb bales.  
Source: US Department of Agriculture, World Demand and Supply Estimates. 
 
Energy became a significant external risk to domestic inflation in India during the 1970s, 
following the first oil shock, and has persisted in its contribution since then. One of the 
fundamental drivers of high oil prices is increasing demand in EMEs, whose rising affluence 
is resulting in the relatively rapid growth of energy-intensive activities. As relatively low-cost 
reserves of fossil fuels are exhausted, rising global demand is being met by exploiting higher-
cost sources. The cost differential between petroleum and alternative sources makes such 
sources viable even at their relatively high costs. Steadily rising costs of production, in turn, 
exert inflationary pressures on the global economy, which hits those economies hardest 
whose energy intensity is increasing most rapidly (Gokarn (2010a)). In recent years, the 
prices of petroleum, as well as other commodities, are perceived to have been further 
impacted by their emergence as an attractive asset class. However, as significant as the 
contribution of this factor may have been for price increases, the underlying fundamentals 
(demand-supply) are what will continue to drive prices in the coming years. While demand-
driven inflation shocks can be avoided by prudent monetary and fiscal policies, the 
vulnerability of the domestic price process to supply shocks emanating from international 
commodity prices is likely to persist.  
5. Conclusion 
Over the past two decades, financial linkages have become stronger, resulting in a higher 
degree of business cycle co-movement, which has also led to faster transmission of shocks 
across countries. In India, too, trade openness has significantly increased, along with higher 
capital account openness, which is reflected in greater synchronisation of domestic business 
cycles with those of advanced and other emerging market economies. Further, among the 
trade and financial channels, the latter seems to be more significant during the recent period 
in transmitting the effects of global developments to the domestic economy, evident in the 
faster and significant impact on domestic asset prices. Concomitantly, with the growing 
global integration of domestic financial markets, regulatory and prudential policies have to 
ensure that domestic financial markets and market participants are in a position to absorb 
unanticipated and large shocks that can emanate from global developments so that the 
financial stability objective is not compromised.  BIS Papers No 57  199
 
 
While larger capital flows in the past reflected higher growth differentials, strong domestic 
macroeconomic fundamentals, growing investor confidence and liberalisation of the capital 
account, there have also been associated costs in terms of the inherent volatility of portfolio 
flows and their implications for exchange rate volatility, asset price pressures and domestic 
liquidity management. Although some countries have had recourse to direct capital controls 
in the form of variants of Tobin taxes to overcome these challenges, the Indian approach so 
far has been to abstain from such measures. Nevertheless, risks from volatile flows remain 
an important concern in India.  
Another important manifestation of the globalisation of monetary policy is challenges faced in 
maintaining price stability due to global supply shocks. Empirical tests suggest that there is a 
significant causal effect from global commodity prices to domestic prices in India. This 
imparts some degree of exogeneity to the price formation process. It is often believed that 
monetary policy cannot do much about supply shocks such as rising food and energy prices, 
which may be true to some extent. Nevertheless, monetary policy in India is concerned about 
global commodity price shocks, given their spillover effects on core inflation through input 
cost increases and wage-price spirals, which could ultimately unsettle inflation expectations 
and lead to generalised price pressures. The trend in imported inflation for India indicates 
that it remained above domestic inflation, mainly due to elevated price pressures from 
minerals, fuel, edible oil and chemical products. Given the tight global demand-supply 
balance in most commodities, global developments may have a significant impact on 
domestic prices. Monetary policy thus has to be vigilant against global price shocks to 
safeguard domestic price stability.  
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